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11. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The Failure to Order a Psvchiatric Evaluation and Conduct a Competency 
Hearing Violated Mr. Hawlcins' Constitutional Due Process Rights and I.C. 68 18- 
210 and 18-211. 
The state and Mr. Hawltins agree that due process prohibits the trial of an individual who 
lacks mental competency. Indiana v. Edwards, U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2379,2383 (2008); 
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402,80 S.Ct. 788 (per curianz); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 
162, 95 S.Ct. 896 (1975). Appellant's Opening Brief at 18; Respondent's Brief at 14. And, both 
the state and Mr. Hawkins agree that I.C. $9 18-210 and 18-211 require the trial court to order a 
psychological evaluation when there is reason to doubt the defendant's competence to assist in 
his own defense or understand the proceedings. Id And, both the state and Mr. Hawkins agree 
that a trial judge must conduct a.competency hearing, regardless oE whether defense counsel 
requests one, whenever the evidence before the judge raises a bona fide doubt about the 
defendant's competence to stand trial. Willianzs 1). Woodford, 384 F.3d 567,603-4 (9"' Cir. 
2004). Appellant's Opening Brief at 19; Respondent's Brief at 15. And, finally, both the state 
and Mr. Hawlcins agree that to be competent, a defendant must have "a rational as well as a 
jkctztal understanding of the proceedings against him" and have "sufficient present ability to 
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of ratiolzal ~~nderstaizding." Dusky v. United 
States, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S.Ct. at 788 (emphasis added); Appellant's Brief at 18; Respondent's 
Brief at 15. 
Where the state and Mr. Hawkins disagree is here: the state is urging this Court to make 
no distinction between "rational" and "factual" understanding and to find that because Mr. 
Hawkins is intelligent and articulale, he was competent to stand trial even though he was also 
delusional. Respondent's Brief at 15-24. In th'e alternative, Mr. Hawkins is asking this Court to 
hold that the evidence before the trial court of his delusional thinking was such that it raised a 
bonajde doubt of his competence to stand trial. 
The crux of the state's argument is that even though, in the state's own words, Mr. 
Hawltins' defense "possibly even indicated a level of delusional thinking relating to the 
commission of the bank robberies and the reasons therefor," Respondent's Brief at 19, there was 
no reason to doubt his competency to stand trial. To reach this conclusion, the state is implicitly 
asking this Court to hold that there is no difference between a factual and a rational 
understanding of the workings of the judicial system and the charges leveled therein. In other 
words, the state is asking this Couit to delete the requirement of rationality from the standard for 
determining competency. The Court does not want to accept the state's invitation and, moreover, 
may not inlight of United States Supreme Court precedent. 
The state focuses its argument on Mr. Hawkins' intelligence, his general ability to follow 
court rules, and his articulateness. It argues that because Mr. Hawkins was able to file motions, 
be responsive and courteous, and display a general understanding of the workings of the criminal 
system, he was competent. (Although, one might question how well Mr. Hawkins was able to 
file motions and follow rules since he was unable to drdt  and serve his subpoenas, including the 
one for Richard Armitage, successl'ully.) However, a person can be intelligent, articulate, and 
able to read and follow rules of procedure, but still be unable to rationally understand the 
proceedings because of delusional thinking. Intelligence and insanity are not mutually exclusive 
conditions. Hence, the archetype of the mad genius in popular culture. 
Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10"' Cir. 1991), cert.denied, 504 U.S. 911 (1992), 
explains how one can have the intellectual capacity to understand the proceedings but still lack 
rationality and so be incompetent to stand trial. 
It is beyond dispute that the Supreme Court's legal definition of competency . . . 
mandates the conclusion that a defendant lacks the requisite rational 
understanding if his mental condition precludes him from perceiving accurately, 
interpreting, andlor responding appropriately to the world around him. Thus, he 
must have 'a rational as well as a factual understanding of proceedings against 
him.' Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S.Ct. at 789; see also United States v.'Hemsi, 
901 F.2d 293,296 (2d Cir. 1990) (petitioner had intellectual understanding of 
charges against him but his impaired sense of reality substantially undermined his 
judgment and prevented him from cooperating rationally with his lawyer). 
Although the facts in each case vary, the circuits addressing competency after 
Dusky, including our own, have used a sufficient contact with reality as the 
touchstone for ascertaining the existence of a rational understanding. See, e.g., 
Colemaiz [v. Safle] ,  912 F.2d [1217,] 1227; Hemsi, 901 F.2d at 296; Balfour [v. 
Flaws], 892 F.2d [556,] 561; Stricklaizd v. Francis, 738 F.2d 1542,. 1551-52 (11'" 
Cir. 1984). 
949 F.2d at 1551. See also, Lokos v. Capps, 625 F.2d 1258, 1267-69 (5"' Cir. 1980) (Expert 
testimony that the defendant was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia at the time of trial, 
which made him unable to grasp reality, compelled a conclusion of incompetency, even though 
the record contained lay testimony relating to rational behavior.) 
In Laferty, the defendant was oriented in time and place and aware of the nature of the 
court proceedings. Indeed, his behavior was consistent and logical. However, he was paranoid 
and delusional, bel~eving that during a religious revelation he had been instructed to "remove" 
his sister-in-law, her infant, and two other people. The Second Circuit found that the trial court 
erred in finding Lafferty competent to be tried for murder given his delusional thinking. 449 
Mr. Hawkins may have been articulate. (Although, he was unable to speak when it came 
time to do closing argument.) He may have been able to draft and file motions. (Although, he 
certainly was not very good at filing meritorious motions. The record is replete with motions he 
filed that were quickly and soundly denied, and as noted before, he was unsuccessful in 
subpoenaing witnesses for his defense.) And, he may have been intelligent. But, he also gave 
indication after indication after indication of delusional thinking. Even the state itself admits as 
much. Respondent's Brief at 19, (stating that the defense "possibly even indicated a level of 
delusional thinking."). 
These indications of delusional thinking, from his actions during the robberies 
themselves, to his statements to Mr. Calley, to his statements to the police from the moment of 
his arrest onward, to his entire theory of the defense, showed a lack of rational understanding 
such that the District Court should have entertained a hoizafide doubt of his competency to stand 
trial. In this case, the failure to appoint an expert and hold a competency hearing violated the 
federal and state constitutional rights to due process and I.C. S 18-21 1 
As set out in  the Opening BrieC, Mr. Hawkins now aslts in accord with Dusky, szlpm, and 
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 183,95 S.Ct. 896,909 (1975), that his convictions be reversed 
leaving the state free to retry him if he is now competent to stand trial. 
B. In the Alternative, this Case Should Be Remanded for a Determination of 
Whether Mr. Hawkins was Competent to Waive his Constitutional Right to 
Counsel. 
The state and Mr. FIawkins both agree that Irzdiarza v. Edwards, - U.S. -, 128 S.Ct 
2379 (2008), applies to this case. Appellant's Brief at 23; Respondent's Brief at 24-27. And, 
both the state and Mr. Hawkins agree that Edwards holds that the waiver oF the right to counsel 
requires a higher degree of competency than the level of competency required to stand trial. 
Edwards, - U.S. at -, 128 S. Ct. at 2386. Appellant's Brief at 23; Respondent's Brief at 25. 
The state and Mr. Hawkins disagree in two particulars: first, the state argues that Edwards 
did not establish any standard for competency to waive the right to counsel, while Mr. Hawltins, 
relying on Edwards and United Slates v. Ferguson, 560 F.3d 1060 (9'h Clr. 2009), pet. for cert. 
pending, argues that the relevant inquiry, in other words, the standard, to be considered by the 
trial court is "whether the defendant is able to 'carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own 
defense without the help of counsel."' Ferguson, 590 F.3d at 1068, quoting Edwards, - U.S. at 
-, 128 S.Ct. at 2386.' Second, the state argues that the trial court did make an analysis 
consistent with Edwards even though the trial court did not know that Edwards was going to be 
decided or that a higher competency level is required to waive counsel than to stand trial. Mr 
Hawluus argues that given the District Court could not have known the proper inquiry and could 
not have made it, the case should now be remanded for a finding by that court as to whether had 
it been aware of Edwards it would have made a different determination regarding Mr. Hawkins' 
request to waive counsel.' Appellant's Brief at 25; Respondent's Br id  at 24-27 
With regard to the first difference, the cases speak for themselves. While the Supreme 
Court declined in Edwarcls to set out a specific test to be applied to determine competency to 
waive counsel, the Court did state, as noted in Ferguson, that the relevant question is whether the 
ddendant is able to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help 
of counsel. Edwards, - U.S. at -, 128 S.Ct. at 2386; Ferguson, 590 F.3d at 1068. 
I Appellant's counsel quoted this language in the Opening Brief at page 23, but 
inadvertently cited only Edwards and not Fergusoiz, even though Fergusoiz is the source for the 
full quotation. Counsel apologizes for any confusion caused by this mistalte. 
There is no doubt that Edwards applies to this case even though it had not been 
announced at the time of the trial. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708 (1987); 
State v. Josephson, 123 Idaho 790,795, 852 P.2d 1382, 1392 (1993). 
5 .  
With regard to the dcond difference between the state's argument and Mr. Hawkins's 
argument, the record does not indicate that the district court made an Edwards inquiry. The 
record does not reflect the District Court considering whether Mr. Hawluns was able to carry out 
the basic tasks needed to present his own defense. Rather, when questioning Mr. Hawkins 
regarding his desire to proceed pro se all the District Court asked was whether he had ever been 
diagnosed or treated for mental illness and/or was taking medication to treat mental illness. 
Supp. Tr. p. 13, In. 16-19; Tr. 1140, In. 2-18. This is an inadequate inquiry, as one may have 
serious mental illness and be taking medication but still be able to perform the tasks needed to 
represent oneself. For example, a person could have an anxiety disorder and still be able to make 
a rational assessment of what defense to present and present it in an effective manner. On the 
other hand, a person, like Mr. Rawkins, might not have a prior diagnosis, yet still have delusional 
thought patterns such that he cannot make a rational assessment of the facts and the law and 
present a defense. 
The state cites several places in the record which it argues show the District Court making 
an analysis under the higher standard of competency set out by Edwards. Respondent's Brief at 
26. As shown below, closer inspection shows that the District Court was not applying an 
Edwards analysis. 
The state's first cite is from a hearing held after the trial, but before sentencing. In 
discussing its earlier decision to order a psychological evaluation prior to sentencing, the District 
Court stated that throughout the proceedings, the Court had never been given any reason to 
believe that Mr. Hawkins had a mental disease or defect that caused him to lack the capacity to 
understand the proceedings against him orto assist in his own defense. Tr. 1120, In. 15-25, p. 
1121, In. 1-14. While the state argues that this is indicative of a finding that Mr. Hawkins was 
able to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his owndefense, this is actually a finding that 
is nearly verbatim the finding required to hold someone competent to stand trial. Specifically, 
this is a finding that Mr. Hawkins had an understanding of the facts and an ability to consult with 
his attorney.; Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S.Ct. at 788. And, as the state has 
agreed, post-Edwards waiver of the right to counsel requires a greater level of competency than 
the level needed to stand trial. Edwards, - U.S. at -, 128 S. Ct. at 2386; Respondent's Brief 
at 25. 
The state's second cite is from the same hearing. Tr. 13. 1126, in. 1-17. At that point, the 
district court stated that Mr. Hawkins's post-trial motions were filed, cited specific rules, and 
were well a~ticulated. This the Court concluded, "gives the Couit further reason to believe that, 
Mr. Hawltins, you're fully capable and competent to proceed. You understand the scope of these 
proceedings. You are filing what would be considered to be very appropriate post-trial motions." 
Tr. p. 1126, In. 11-17. Again, the Court was looking at Mr. Hawkins's ability to understand the 
proceedings. While the Court made reference to filing appropriate motions, the Court did not 
specifically consider whether over the entire course of the trial and post-trial period, Mr. 
Hawkins had been capable of performing the basic tasks needed to present his defense. While 
filing motions, (note that these post-trial motions that the court praised, stand-by counsel refused 
to argue because he believed they were so patently frivolous) is apar t  of presentation of a 
defense, it is far from the whole job. To present his defense, Mr. Hawkins needed to be able to 
' As discussed above, this statement by the District Court was not part of a required 
competency hearing and it was erroneous because i t  did not take into account the indications of 
irrational delusional thought processes by Mr. Hawkins. 
subpoena his witnesses, something he could not do successfully. He needed to make a closing 
argument, something he could not do. But, most importantly, he needed to have a non-delusional 
understanding of the underlying facts and the theory of the case. And, as even the state admits 
when it notes that his defense may have reflected delusional thinking, this most important 
foundational element of presenting a case appeared to be beyond Mr. Hawlcins. 
The state's next citation comes from the hearing on the motion for a new trial. Tr. p. 
1141, in. 23-25, p. 1142, In. 1-10. At that time, the District Court stated that Mr. Hawltins had 
filed well articulated motions and that he had demonstrated that he grasped the nature of the 
proceedings, understood the process and the criminal justice system. Again, this is the standard 
of competency to stand trial - an understanding of the proceedings and an ability to consult with 
counsel. Dusky, s u p m  This is not a finding that Mr. Hawkins could perform the basic tasks 
needed to sepresent himself. An understanding o'the process is nG the equivalent of an ability 
to forin and present a rational theory of the case to a jury. Edwards, supm. 
The state's final citation comes from the same hearing. Tr. p. 1147, In. 8-16. In those 
lines, the District Court states only that it has found Mr. Hawltins competent to proceed prose. 
The Court does not articulate anywhere that it has applied a higher or even a different standard in 
reaching this decision than it would have applied to a decision finding Mr. Hawkins competent to 
stand trial. The statements cited by the state say only that the Court found Mr. Hawkins 
competent to stand trial. They say nothing about what standard was applied to reach that 
decision or whether the same decision would have been reached had the Court made the key 
inquiry: whether Mr. Hawluns was able to perform the basic tasks needed to represent himself. 
The state's final argument against remand is thafremand is unnecessary because Mr. 
Hawltins had stand-by counsel. Respondent's Brief at 26. However, stand-by counsel is 
certainly not the equivalent of counsel. While stand-by counsel might answer individual 
questions, stand-by counsel does not organize and present the case. Those tasks fall to the pro se 
defendant and the presence of stand-by counsel is not sufficient to override the concerns about 
competency addressed in Edwards. Consider Ferguson. In that case, advisory counsel was 
appointed. The Ninth Circuit did not find, and did not even suggest, that the presence of an 
advisory counsel or stand-by counsel should alter the nature of the fundamental inquiry as to 
whether a particular defendant is competent to act in apro  se capacity. 
Based upon Edwards and Fergusorz and the arguments set out in Appellant's Opening 
Brief and above, Mr. I-Iawkins requests, that in the event his conviction is not reversed based on 
the failure to hold a hearing to determine his competency to stand trial, that this case be 
remanded for a finding as to whether under the higher standard of Edwards the district court 
would have still found him competent to waive his right to counsel. 
111. CONCLUSION 
As set out in the Opening Brief and above, the convictions in this case must be reversed 
because the District Court el-red in not determining Mr. Hawkins' competency to stand trial. In 
the alternative, the case must be remanded to the District Court for a determination of whether 
Mr. Hawkins was mentally competent to waive his right to counsel and represent himself at trial. 
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